Abstract-In this paper, we study the trade off in resource allocation between malicious intrusion (jamming) and communication/coordination by two teams of mobile agents. Agents belonging to the same team communicate over wireless ad hoc networks, and they distribute their available power between the tasks of communication and jamming the communication network nodes of the other team. This is a generalization of our earlier work in [7] which considered the special case when each team consists of only two agents. Here we consider the nontrivial extension to multiple agents (in each team). The agents have constraints on their total energy and instantaneous power usage. The cost function adopted is the difference between the rates of erroneously transmitted bits of each team.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, enormous research has been done to deploy multiple vehicles in formation to carry out tasks in military as well as civilian scenarios. The recent availability of low-cost UAVs has led to the deployment of teams of vehicles consisting of terrestrial and aerial vehicles to perform various tasks such as mapping, surveillance, search and tracking operations in a cooperative manner [12] [25] . In the past year, there have been reports of predator drones being hacked [14] , [20] resulting in intruders gaining access to classified data being transmitted from an aircraft. Unauthorized intrusion of such kind has started a race between the engineers and the hackers as a result of which smarter systems are emerging everyday in order to secure modern instrumentation and software from unwanted exogenous attacks. This work deals with such a scenario of malicious intrusion and disruption, namely jamming in the communication network of multi-agent systems.
In general, the mode of communication among vehicles deployed in a team mission is wireless. The decentralized nature of wireless ad hoc networks makes them vulnerable to security threats. This renders the communication channel vulnerable to malicious attacks from an intruder present in the vicinity. A prominent example of such threats is jamming: a malicious attack whose objective is to disrupt the communication of the victim network intentionally, causing interference or collision at the receiver side. Jamming attack is a well-studied and an active area of research in a wireless networks. Many defense strategies have been proposed by researchers against jamming in wireless networks. In [29] , Wu et.al. propose two strategies to evade jamming. The first strategy, channel surfing, is a form of spectral evasion that involves legitimate wireless devices changing the channel that they are operating on. The second strategy, spatial retreats, is a form of evasion whereby legitimate devices move away from the jammer. In [27] , Wood et.al. present a distributed protocol to map jammed region so that the network can avoid routing traffic through it. The solution proposed by Cagalj et.al. [10] uses different worm holes (wired worm holes, frequency-hopping pairs, and uncoordinated channel hopping) that lead out of the jammed region to report the alarm to the network operator. In [28] , Wood et.al. investigate how to deliberately avoid jamming in IEEE 802.15.4 based wireless networks. In [11] , Lin Chen et.al. propose a strategy to introduce a special node in the network called the antijammer to drain the jammer's energy. To achieve its goal, the anti-jammer configures the probability of transmitting bait packets to attract the jammer to transmit. Recently, researchers have found instances of jamming in biological species. In a series of playback experiments, researchers have found that resident pairs of Peruvian warbling antbirds sing coordinated duets when responding to rival pairs. But under other circumstances, cooperation breaks down, leading to more complex songs. Specifically, it has been reported that females respond to unpaired sexual rivals by jamming the signals of their own mates, who in turn adjust their signals to avoid the interference [26] .
For a static jammer and mobile nodes, the optimal strategy for the nodes is to retreat away from the jammer after detecting jamming. In case of an aerial jamming attack, optimal strategies for retreat are harder to compute due to the mobility of the jammer and constraints in the kinematics of the UAVs. This attack can be modeled as a zero-sum game [2] between the jammer and the UAVs. Such dynamic games governed by differential equations can be analyzed using tools from differential game theory [19] [16] . In the past, differential game theory has been used as a framework to analyze problems in multi-player pursuit-evasion games. Solutions for particular multi-player games were presented by Pashkov and Terekhov [23] , Levchenkov and Pashkov [18] , Hagedorn and Breakwell [15] , Breakwell and Hagedorn [9] and Sriram et.al. [24] . In the past, we have provided spatial retreat strategies for a team of UAVs trying to establish a communication link in the presence of an aerial jammer in the vicinity [4] , [3] , [6] . We have also analyzed the problem of jamming from the perspective of a connectivity maintenance problem in multi-agent systems [5] . In [7] , [17] , we addressed a double-sided jamming game between two teams of mobile agents. A slight modification in this game compared to the previous one is that the vehicles within a team can communicate among themselves in addition to jamming the communication network of the opposite team. These papers analyzed the case when each team contains two agents. In this work, we extend the problem of doublesided jamming game to address the case when the two teams contain an arbitrary number of agents. When more than two members are present in a team, we need to account for the interference that occurs due to the communication between members within one team. This leads to a modified set of sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy saddle point equilibrium for the power allocation game.
In Section II, we present the problem formulation. Section III provides the solution to the differential game problem. Section IV provides the solution to the optimal power allocation problem. Section V provides simulation results for different scenarios. Finally, we conclude in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this work, we consider two teams of mobile agents moving on a plane. Within each team, the agents are communicating among themselves. Additionally, each agent is equipped with an omni-directional antenna that jams the communication link between members of the other team. In order to simplify the scenario, we assume that the two teams are communicating at different frequencies, and the frequency of each team is common knowledge among all the agents. Regarding the communication within members in a team, we assume that all the agents are equipped with antennas so that pairwise communication is possible between any two members within a team. Moreover, each antenna can generate a radiation pattern so as to effectively communicate in any given direction. Since this work is a generalization to our previous paper [7] , we assume that Team A is comprised of m players {a 1 , . . . , a m } and Team B is comprised of n players {b 1 , . . . , b n }, where m and n can be arbitrary. Since the agents move on a plane, each agent has two degrees of freedom (x, y). The dynamics of the players are given by the following equations:
• Team B:ẋ
where x i = (x i , y i ) and u i denote vectors representing the state and control input of agent i, with the superscript (a or b) identifying the corresponding team. The state space of the entire system is represented by
is uniformly continuous, bounded and Lipschitz continuous in x i for fixed u i . Consequently, given a fixed u i (·) and an initial point, there exists a unique trajectory solving (1) and (2) [1] . Now, we describe the communication model between a transmitter-receiver pair in the presence of a jammer which is similar to our previous work in [7] , [17] . Let d be the distance between the transmitter and the receiver. The power of the signal at the receiver's end is given by the following expression
where P T is the constant power at which the signal is emitted by the transmitter, α is the dissipation factor, and ρ is a constant that depends on the antennas' gains, and the wavelength of the transmitted signal. An example that demonstrates the calculation of ρ is provided in [7] .
The signal-to-interference ratio (SINR) received by agent a j due to the signal transmitted by agent a i is given by the following expression
where
: Ambient Gaussian noise level,
I 1 is the interference caused due to the communication between a j and members of team A other than a i . I 2 is the interference caused due to the jamming signal produced by members of Team B. P a kj is the power level at which agent a k transmits the signal to agent a j . P Given the expression for SINR, the Bit Error Rate (BER) is given by the following expression:
where g(·) is a decreasing function of s. The instantaneous BER depends on the SINR, the modulation scheme, and the error control coding scheme utilized. From the communications literature, closed-form expressions and tight bounds can be used to calculate the BER when the noise and interference are assumed to be Gaussian [13] . For uncoded M-QAM, where Gray encoding is used to map the bits into the symbols of the constellation, the BER can be approximated by [22] 
, and Q(.) is the tail probability of the standard Gaussian distribution. In this work, we assume that the both teams communicate with the same modulation scheme at different frequencies.
For an initial position x 0 ∈ X, the outcome of the game π, is given by the following expression:
; N is the rate at which bits are transmitted which is assumed to be constant throughout the game; and T is the time of termination of the game. p i depends in s i , i.e, the SINR perceived by agent i. From (3), s i depends on the mutual distances between the players. Therefore, we can see that the outcome functional, π, depends on the state of the players and hence, their control inputs. The outcome functional models the difference in the erroneous communication packets exchanged between the members of the same team during the entire course of the game. The objective of team A is to minimize π and the objective of team B is to maximize it.
Let P a i (t) and P b j (t) denote the instantaneous power levels for communication used by player i in Team A and player j in Team B, respectively. Since the agents are mobile, there are limitations on the amount of energy available to each agent that is dictated by the capacity of the power source carried by each agent. We model this restriction as the following integral constraint for each agent
The game is said to terminate when any one agent runs out of power, that is (8) is violated. In addition to the energy constraints, there are limitations on the maximum power level of the devices that are used on-board each agent for the purpose of communication. For each player, this constraint is modeled by the following set of inequalities:
At every instant, each agent has to decide on the fraction of the power that needs to be allocated for communication and jamming. Each player uses its power for the following purposes: (1) Communicating with the team-mates, and (2) Jamming the communication of the other team. With this in mind, we define the following terms: 1) γ ij : The fraction of the instantaneous power, P a i (t), used by agent a i to communicate with agent a j . 2) γ i : The fraction of the instantaneous power, P 
In order to solve the problem, we need to compute the values of the following variables at each instant for all the agents:
1) The instantaneous control, u i (t).
2) The instantaneous power level, P i (t). III. DIFFERENTIAL GAME PROBLEM From the problem formulation presented in the previous section, we can conclude that the objective functions of the two teams are in conflict. The (m + n)-tuple ({u
) is said to be optimal for the players if it satisfies the following conditions:
In simple terms, the above equations imply that agents in a single team have a common objective function. For members of Team A, the problem is to minimize the outcome and for members of team B, the problem is to maximize the outcome. Since, the two teams are playing a zero-sum game against one another, the value of the game, denoted by the function J : X → R, can be defined as follows:
In order to compute the optimal control of the players, we will use the Isaacs' conditions [16] . These provide the necessary conditions that need to be satisfied by the Hamiltonian of the system when the players follow their optimal strategies. The Hamiltonian of the system is given by the following expression:
From the analysis in [7] , we obtain the following equations that govern the optimal controls of the players
In addition to the above conditions, the value function also satisfies the retrogressive path equation which is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The value function follows the following partial differential equation (PDE) along the optimal trajectory, namely the retrogressive path equation (RPE)
where˚denotes derivative with respect to retrograde time.
The proof of the above theorem is an extension to the twoplayer scenario presented in [16] . This leads to the following set of partial differential equation for the players of Team A.
In the above expression, ( .) denotes derivative with respect to retrograde time. In this problem, the game terminates when any player uses up all its energy. Therefore, the terminal condition is not a function of the position of the players. Hence J at the terminal manifold is independent of the position of the players. This implies that ∇J = 0 at termination. This forms the boundary condition for the RPE. A similar relation holds for the players in Team B, and can be obtained from the RPE.
In the next section, we address the problem of power allocation.
IV. POWER ALLOCATION
From (4) in Section II, the SINR received agent a j due to the signal transmitted by a i , in terms of the power levels of the other agents as well as their mutual distances is given by the following expression:
Since the players do not communicate, they possess information only about their own decision variables. From (11), we can conclude that the power allocation among the agents only affects the term L in the Hamiltonian. From Isaacs' conditions, the optimal strategies of agents a i and b i are to minimize and maximize, respectively, the Hamiltonian of the system. This renders the power allocation problem a continuous kernel zero-sum game between the players of the two teams. The objective of each player in the team is given as follows:
Team A: The objective of agent a i is given by the following
Team B: The objective of agent b i is given by the following
Now we consider the problem of allocating the instantaneous power level for each player. From the expression of the SINR and objective function of each agent in both the teams, we can conclude that the optimal value of the power consumption for each player is P max . Therefore, the following lemma regarding the time horizon of the differential game follows immediately.
Lemma 1: The entire game terminates in a fixed time T = E Pmax irrespective of the initial position of the agents. Now we consider the problem of optimally splitting the power level of each player for communicating within its own team, and for jamming members of the other team. Since L is a continuous function of the decision variables of all the players, and the decision variables of each player lie on a simplex which is compact, we can conclude that the power allocation game has a saddle-point equilibrium in mixed strategies [2, p. 178] . Therefore, the game admits a Mixed Strategy Saddle Point Equilibrium (MSSPE). Although, the MSSPE has been computed for some games by exploiting some special characteristics in the cost functions, there are no standard techniques to compute MSSPE for general continuous-kernel games [2] , [21] . Therefore, we search for the conditions under which the power allocation game admits a pure strategy saddle-point equilibrium (PSSPE).
Theorem 2: The power allocation team game has a unique saddle-point equilibrium in pure strategies if the following conditions hold
• Player a i in Team A:
Proof: Let us consider the case of a i . From Theorem 2, we can conclude that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists if L a i is convex in its arguments when the decision variables of the other players are fixed. From [8] The above constrained optimization problems can be solved to obtain the values of the decision variables by invoking the KKT conditions (as in [7] ).
V. RESULTS
In this section, we present simulation results for motion control and power allocation among the agents as proposed in the previous sections. Figure 1 and Figure 2 Figure 1 , we have two teams of four agents each. In the second scenario, shown in Figure  2 , we have two teams of an unequal number of agents. From the simulation scenarios, we observe that as time progresses, the agents approach each other in order to establish a stronger communication network. Figure 3 shows the fraction of the power split by each agent in order to communicate among its team members for the scenario depicted in Figure 1 . From the simulations, one can conclude that over the entire horizon of the game each agents spends approximately equal amount of energy to communicate with each member in its own team. However, the relation between the instantaneous power levels expended by agents for each communication link, and their mutual distances is a topic of ongoing research. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the trade off in resource allocation between malicious intrusion (jamming) and communication/coordination by two teams of mobile agents. Agents belonging to the same team communicate over wireless ad hoc networks, and they distribute their available power between the tasks of communication and jamming the communication network nodes of the other team. This is a generalization of our earlier work in [1] which considered the special case when each team consists of only two agents. Here we considered the non-trivial extension to multiple agents (in each team). The agents have constraints on their total energy and instantaneous power usage. The cost function adopted is the difference between the rates of erroneously transmitted bits of each team.
We modeled the problem as a zero-sum differential game between the two teams (where the teams are the actual players in the zero-sum game) and used Isaacs' approach to obtain necessary conditions for the corresponding trajectories. The solution to the optimal control problem for each team in turn depends on the solution to the power allocation problem for each agent. The power allocation problem is a non-zero sum game between the two teams, and we presented sufficient conditions for the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Finally, we provided some simulation results to validate the approach taken. Future work includes applying techniques from mean field games in order to extend the current scenario to infinite number of players in each team. Another interesting problem for future consideration is a slight modification of the current problem in which each agent has to consider the energy spent in motion while deciding the optimal power allocation.
